|
A Guide to Implementing the Theory of
Constraints (TOC) |
|||||
|
Deming |
Taylor & Social Darwinism |
Toyota, Kaizen, & Lean |
|
|
Introduction This large and
substantial section has sat around without a home of its own since late 2008
and in early 2014 I put it back where it came from – as a “calve-off” from
the paradox of systemism. I have
probably spent more time on this “page” than any other. In truth there is a little
more to be done yet. Somewhere near
the end you will see a “stop here” and you ought to stop there because the
remainder is incomplete at this moment.
I hope that this page will help you to understand how and why we know
and understand what we know and understand.
We know and understand much more than we can tell and this page will
to help to formulate some of the conceptual coat-hangers needed to deal with
this. I try to teach students ....
that in scientific research you start from two beginnings,
each of which has its own kind of authority: the observations cannot be
denied, and fundamentals must be fitted.
You must achieve a sort of pincers maneuver (Bateson, 1979 pg xxviii). This page is an endeavor to bundle together, and make personal sense
of, a collection of fundamental thoughts by; Gregory Bateson, Michael
Polanyi, Thomas Kuhn, Ikujiro Nonaka, Hirotaka Takeuchi, Russell Ackoff, and
Elliott Jaques, and which might be broadly termed epistemology, or about how we
know what we know. Why should I choose
to concentrate upon these people and what they have to say? I choose to, simply, because their thoughts
matter to me. Their thoughts matter to
me, and matter a great deal at that, because they inform how I am able
interpret modern industrial systems and the way in which people construct and
operate these systems – for better, or more commonly, for worse. We should all know such things in order to
avoid the latter and encompass the former. It was the recognition of tacit and explicit knowledge, of individual
and group interaction, and an understanding of whole systems that I will
loosely call “recent” epistemology or ontology that was important to me even
before I had a formal understanding of their underpinnings. Indeed, when I first tried to make formal
sense of this I confused myself “no end” with older “traditional”
epistemologies and ontologies.
Eventually I had to split these out into their historic sequence;
“traditional” first, “recent” last, and some partial cross-over
in-between. This will become more
apparent as we work through this page. Steven Jay Gould in one of his essays mentions the notion of “context
of discovery” and “context of justification” (Gould 1996 pg 94). How we actually discover things and how we
later justify that discovery are never quite the same. He called this the “logic” and
“psychologic” of scientific conclusion.
As a scientist my concept of paradigm – which ultimately this page is
about – is buried somewhere in the past within my own experience and within
my own context of discovery, however, on the healthcare pages I have built a
context of justification that I extend back to one of my earliest lectures as
a student of the earth sciences. That
section may therefore also help you to understand my understanding of
paradigm. What then of Theory of Constraints?
Well I believe that “cost world” and “throughput world” resonate with
anyone who understands paradigm, and I credit Thomas Corbett in his book on
Throughput Accounting (Corbett 1998) for placing Theory of Constraints
formally within a paradigmal framework.
I purchased Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962)
several months later but it didn’t become fully relevant to me until several
years on. In the intervening period,
while in Japan, I read a text by Nonaka and Takeuchi called The
Knowledge-Creating Company (1995) which had a profound impact upon me because
it formally recognized the tacit/explicit dichotomy that I both understood
from past personal experience and that I was also able to “see” at that time
everyday within the workplace. My
understanding of paradigm at that stage is recorded in a page in the strategy
section. I have not revisited that
page since and neither do I intend to.
I hope that this page builds a firmer base upon that former page. Nonaka and Takeuchi did not mention Kuhn, but they did draw from
Gregory Bateson and Michael Polanyi.
This is also the first time that epistemology became a conscious
concept for me. Gregory Bateson had appeared
in various places for a number of years prior to this within the context of
Neuro-Linguistic Programming and eventually I got to his original work, and
then that of Michael Polanyi. I
finely “squared the circle” with the work Russell Ackoff. And to my current way of thinking I was
“stuck” in my synthesis of this knowledge until I became aware of several of
Ackoff’s concepts. It is Ackoff’s
hierarchies that I “hang” everything else off of – as you will see. About the only one still left out in the cold is Karl Popper, despite having sat on my Amazon wish list for more years than I care to count, he will have to remain there for some time to come. His concepts are important and are included here, if not directly referenced, as I have relied on other peoples’ reporting of these to-date rather than examine them first-hand. This page makes extensive use of quotations, that is because it is what other people have had to say that is so important, so why not extract it verbatim. As a consequence I’ve reverted to “type” and have used scientific referencing conventions of author and date within the text, with the addition of the specific page numbers so that people know exactly where to look to follow things up. However, nothing is simple. Several of the texts that I have used of Bateson, Kuhn, and Ackoff are compilations of previously published papers. I think that ideas ought to be credited with the priority of publication so where the reference is to a compilation I have put the original year of publication first, followed by the date and page reference of the compilation. If nothing else, it will give people a better feel for how long we have known so much of this material. The primary genesis of the ideas of Kuhn and Ackoff goes back to the early 1940’s. Significant parts of Polanyi’s 1958 work were published in papers between 1952 and 1958. Epistemology is “how we can know
anything” (Bateson 1979, pg 4), or “the
history of knowledge; in other words how you know what you know” (Bateson,
quoted in Dilts 1998 pg 16).
Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge (Taleb 2007, pg 20) and as
knowledge is the “mother of all sciences,” then epistemology is also the
philosophy of science (Taleb 2004, pp 48, 49). For a brief and hard to beat summary of the
philosophy of science, contrasted with the methodology of science, by Russell
Ackoff please check here.
Otherwise lets continue. Philosophers have recognized
and separated two sorts of problem.
There are first the problems of how things are, what is a person, and
what sort of world this is. These are
problems of ontology. Second, there
are the problems of how we know anything, or more specifically, how we know
what sort of a world it is and what sort of creatures we are that can know
something (or perhaps nothing) of this matter. These are problems of epistemology (Bateson
1972, pg 313). So not only is knowing how we know important (epistemology), but what
we know “of” is also equally important (ontology). Ontology is about the existence of beings
or things and their groupings or hierarchy.
Hierarchy, and in particular logical types and errors of, becomes an
important thread in this page and part of the reason for the paradox of
systemism. Epistemology and ontology present us with a problem of huge relevance. In the natural history of the
living human being, ontology and epistemology cannot be separated. His (commonly unconscious) beliefs about
what sort of world it is will determine how he sees it and acts within it,
and his ways of perceiving and acting will determine his beliefs about its
nature. The living man is thus bound
within a net of epistemological and ontological premises which ‑ regardless
of ultimate truth or falsity ‑ become partially self-validating for him
(Bateson 1972, pg 314). The concept and
acknowledgment of self-validation within epistemology and ontology is another
important thread that will repeat itself on various levels throughout this
page. Bateson; an anthropologist, uses
totemism to illustrate self-validation (1979, pp 133-135), and Polanyi uses
poison-oracle of the Azande in a similar fashion (1958, pp 287-294). Polanyi describes how even anomaly can be
accommodated, in fact, must be accommodated within this circularity. Our epistemology and ontology are clearly
cultural. Let’s briefly look at this;
it is important to our discussion. I have used the concept of Nonaka and Takeuchi of tacit and explicit knowledge throughout this website, and implicitly in my work before I ever knew that I was allowed to think such things. Much earlier in the page on Leadership and learning we saw this diagram;
This is an epistemological view. There is also a similar ontological view. It was un-drawn, it was staring me in the face, and now I finally see it. Let’s have a look at this.
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s ontological dimension is; from individual, to group, to organization, to inter-organization – a hierarchy of groups of people in a business process. Nonaka and Takeuchi recognise that; Epistemologically, ...Westerners tend to emphasize explicit knowledge and Japanese tend to stress tacit knowledge. Ontologically, Westerners are more focused on individuals, while the Japanese are more group oriented (1995, pg 243). I couldn’t encapsulate the end-state cultural differences better than that, although clearly it is a continuum. Bateson, originally an anthropologist, also frequently draws distinctions around occidental interpretations as distinct from oriental ones. It seems that the epistemologists are acutely aware of the social context. But there’s more. There is to me an apparent paradox between eastern and western approaches. Why is tacit knowledge, which is individually generated, so important within the group-centric oriental context? And, why is explicit knowledge, which is group generated, so important within the individual-centric occidental context? The paradox dissolves the moment that we realise that they are complementary, and that opposite epistemological and ontological approaches need each other, in support of each other. Let me explain. The ill-economy of tacit knowledge transfer can only flourish where groups are strongly bound and long lasting, forming a stable accessible reservoir. Conversely, where groups are strongly bound and long lasting tacit knowledge transfer cannot help but happen. This is the oriental case. The ill-economy of individuals competing against one another can only flourish where explicit knowledge transfer occurs, forming a stable accessible reservoir. Conversely, where explicit knowledge transfer occurs, individuals cannot help but compete against each other. This is the occidental case. These are end-points for sure, but having experienced degrees of both cultures I can attest to their validity. It is the ontological part – the “conflict” between individual and group – that causes us more grief in our attempts to manage modern business systems in the West and underlies the fundamental cloud and the paradox of systemism. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. We need to go back to far more fundamental issues first. Issues of how we know what we know. Here is an outline of the plan. In the
first instance, I set out, biased by Bateson without doubt, to establish a
few issues around sense and perception.
Then I invoke Ackoff’s DIKUW model to establish a description of;
data, information, knowledge, understanding and wisdom – the components of
the acronym. Curiously DIKUW is
commonly embraced within popular “knowledge management” – at least within the
internet – but truncated to DIKW, “understanding” having been omitted from
the sequence. In fact the whole
sequence can, like a telescopic rod or an oriental fan, expand out or
contract in depending upon whether or not both structural and functional
issues are separated out or combined in. DIKUW
is a hierarchy, and I need to establish that, and to flesh it out in order to
“hang” all of the other arguments from, for indeed they too are predominantly
hierarchical across the same continuum.
I proceed do this with; § Traditional epistemological and ontological arguments § Cross-over between traditional and more recent arguments § Recent and business epistemological and ontological
arguments I then
return to some of deeper issues of Bateson and Polanyi around paradigm, then
finally addressing current business issues regarding the systemic nature of
such things. So lets start at the
start with sense and perception. We forget all
too easily in our modern world that all that we know of comes via our
senses. Our sense of touch, sense of
smell, sense of taste, sense of sight, sense of hearing. For a pre-verbal child, this is indeed all
that the child knows – percepts built upon their sensing of their immediate
environment. I never fail to be amazed
at the annual National Agricultural Fieldays where there is a large (and one
would think forbidding) cattle trough full to the brim with dark rich sweet
smelling molasses – something that nowadays almost no small child, and in
these cases clearly verbal and rather mobile, has any concept of. And yet with amazing dexterity the smallest
quickly run up to the trough, tip toe in order to eyeball the fluid surface,
and then up and over goes the arm with a finger extended into the molasses,
nothing untoward happens as a consequence, and so the molasses covered finger
is swiftly brought back towards the mouth and in it goes. It is at about this time that the other
subtle, complex, and not so sweet flavors become apparent to the juvenile
experimenter, and in the next fluid motion the finger is withdrawn from the
mouth and swiftly wiped straight down the front of their clothing! Experiment over; what the nose told, the
mouth did not confirm, let’s move on.
It happens child after child after child, year after year. But what is it
that the senses sense? What is it that
alerted our child experimenters to the molasses? Difference was the trigger, our senses
sense difference. In the case of the
molasses a different smell, a difference (absence) of restraining barriers, a
difference in sight. And all above
threshold. ... science is a way of perceiving and making what we may call
"sense" of our percepts. But
perception is based upon difference. All receipt of information is necessarily
the receipt of news of difference, and all perception of difference is
limited by threshold. Differences that
are too slight or too slowly presented are not perceivable. They are not food for perception. It follows that what we, as scientists, can perceive is always limited by threshold. That is, what is subliminal will not be grist for our mill. Knowledge at any given moment will be a function of the threshold of our available devices of perception (Bateson, 1979 pp 26, 27). Bateson also made much of the fact of “double description” addressed in more detail further on. Two sets of differences always give rise to
the potentiality of differences between the differences – his
information. In terms of our own
sensory perception Bateson thought it not co-incidental that we have two
eyes, two ears, and two nostrils mounted a small distance from each
other. To this we should add the two
lateral lines of fish, so perfectly effective for sensing the transmission of
movement in their incompressible surrounds.
What better way to generate difference – especially from a stationary
object – than from two different measurements taken at the same time. Moreover movement of head or body allows
the movement of these sensory organs around their axis, and a new set of data
to be obtained. Step it out a little
and we can make a paired sensing at each of two instances in time at the same
place if the “target” is mobile, or a paired sensing at each of two instances
in time at two different places if the “target” is stationary. Each mechanism has the potential to
generate difference and more importantly differences about difference. Polanyi gives us a telling story of sensory extension using the
example of a hammer and a nail (1958 pg 56).
The hammer becomes an extension of ourselves. The user has “subsidiary” awareness of the
shaft of the hammer in the palm of the hand and “focal” awareness of the head
of the hammer and the head of the nail.
Subsidiary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive, stop
to think about how you type and look for the keys and you will stop typing,
you have focal awareness of the screen and subsidiary awareness of the
keystrokes (and aggregations of keystrokes for that matter). When you are going downhill on your
mountain bike you have subsidiary awareness of the front and rear brakes and
focal awareness of the bike/terrain interaction. Stop to think about the brakes for a moment
– that is bring them into focal awareness – and you will surely come
off. As they say, trust me, I know. Well, a small problem, we don’t see, for instance, into the
ultraviolet or infrared of insects, nor do we hear the higher frequencies of
bird call – hearing instead a syncopated tune with some of the call
apparently missing. Nor do we hear the
low frequencies of a trumpeting elephant – just the high frequency
overtones. We “overcome” these natural
limitations of threshold by (recent) sensory extension – normally
instrumental. Both Polanyi and Bateson
address these instrumental issues. Instrumentation
aside, there are scale issues which simply confound our human senses. Things that are; astronomically too far,
microscopically too small, geologically too infrequent, geologically too
large, chronologically too long, or chronologically too slow, are all effects
of scale which are quite beyond our immediate senses. Much of scientific paradigm has revolved
around the initial rejection, then later acceptance of these scale issues. In many cases it is not just our percepts
that are challenged but also our precepts as well. To this we must add another aspect, our
social environment. I will assert that
part of our current industrial and organizational problems come from the
sociologically too-similar. There are
important sociological differences afoot that are consequential upon
industrialization, but we fail to recognize them because they are apparently
too similar to what we already know. Not only can we not predict
into the next instant of the future, but, more profoundly, we cannot predict
into the next dimension of the microscopic, the astronomically distant, or
the geologically ancient. As a method
of perception – and that is all that science can claim to be – science, like
all other methods of perception, is limited in its availability to collect
the outward and visible signs of whatever may be truth. Science probes; it does not prove (Bateson, 1979 pg 27). Leading on
from the sociological issues, within any scale there is yet another trap for our
perception, and that is the effect of a change in logical type. In 1927 Bertrand Russell and Alfred
Whitehead raised the issue of errors of logical type where we pass from
member of a set to the set itself, or from a collection of sets to a
superset, but fail to note any step-wise change in the naming, rules, or
logic that occur in consonance with the step-wise increase in logical
type. This is Bateson’s summary; The central thesis of this
theory is that there is a discontinuity between a class and its members. This class cannot be a member of itself nor
can one of the members be the class,
since the term used for the class is of a different level of
abstraction ‑ a different Logical Type ‑ from terms used for
members (Bateson, 1972, pg 202). Problems need
to be solved at a higher logical level than that at which they were
created. Failure to recognize this, I
will assert, in conjunction with the failure to recognize the change in
ontogeny from individual to group of individuals, and from groups of
individuals to groups of groups of individuals, lies at the core of the
paradox of systemism. There is only
one account of errors of logical type in the academic business press that I
am aware of and that belongs to the Shingo Prize winning piece by H. Thomas
Johnson (2006) “Lean dilemma: choose system
principles or management accounting controls, not both.” If the name is familiar to
you, then you have the senior author of a seminal work from 1987 “Relevance Lost:
the rise and fall of management accounting.”
How is it that something so fundamentally important is so little
known? Although it is
Bateson who seems to me to be principally involved in the more general
raising of awareness of errors of logical type, others have too, for instance
Polanyi in The Tacit
Dimension addresses levels of hierarchy (1966, pg 36) … each level is subject to
dual control; first by the laws that apply to its elements in themselves and,
second, by the laws that control the comprehensive entity formed by them. … the operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing its particulars forming the lower level. Ackoff does similar things with systems and their parts … the essential properties of
any system, the properties that define a system, are properties of the whole
which none of its parts have. … the explanation does not lie inside the
[entities]; it lies outside of them (1994 pg 11). In business a
far more prosaic application of this error is to consider that the parts that
constitute the business, and even the individuals within distinct part,
should be in competition with one another, when the real competition is with
other firms, not with ourselves. Don’t
think for one moment that what I am drawing out on this page isn’t directly
applicable to the science of business. If
everything that we know of comes via our perception of our senses, and our
senses perceive difference, and only difference above a threshold, then it
follows that difference is the data of our worldview. At least that was my erroneous logic until
recently. In fact; ’data’
are not events or objects but always records or descriptions or memories of
events or objects.” Always there is a
transformation or recording of the raw event which intervenes between the
scientist and his object. ... In a strict sense, therefore, no data are
truly ‘raw’ and every record has been somehow subjected to editing and
transformation either by man or by his instruments (Batson 1972 pp xxv-xxvi). So, I stand corrected. Records or descriptions or memories of difference are the data of our worldview. Note that we have two forms here; explicit records or descriptions, and tacit memories. They are all abstractions of reality regardless of the form. Why then should I make so much about tacit memory or tacit knowing – which if not already apparent I hope will become more so. And the reason is that physical presence, which tacit knowing presupposes, raises the possibility of greater context, and of serendipity, I may learn to notice things that I didn’t even know that I wanted to notice at the time, or immediately prior to that time, and which are invisible to any explicit record. Data are
measures of difference about; where, what, when, whom, and how many. Data
are, ontologically, about the “thinginess” of an object or an event. Let’s summarize this in a diagram.
"What is it in the territory that gets onto the map?" We know the territory itself does not get onto the map. That is the central point about which we here are all agreed. Now, if the territory were uniform, nothing would get onto the map except the boundaries, which are the points at which it ceases to be uniform against some large matrix. What gets onto the map, in fact, is difference, be it a difference in altitude, a difference in vegetation, a difference in population structure, difference in surface, or whatever. Differences are the things that get onto a map. But what is a difference? A difference is a very peculiar and obscure concept. It is certainly not a thing or an event. This piece of paper is different from the wood of this lectern. There are many differences between them ‑ of color, texture, shape, etc. But if we start to ask about the localization of those differences, we get into trouble. Obviously the difference between the paper and the wood is not in the paper; it is obviously not in the wood; it is obviously not in the space between them, and it is obviously not in the time between them. (Differences which occurs across time is what we call "change.") A difference, then, is an abstract matter Senge’s
partitioning of complexity into detail and dynamic components means that we
now have to take cognizance that; § Detail complexity = know-what § Dynamic Complexity = know-when and
know-where This is the
very first level in our DIKUW hierarchy.
Let’s look at the next level, information. “Information
consists of differences that makes a difference” (Bateson 1979, pg 92). I guess that to be entirely internally
consistent I would have to say that information consists of records or
descriptions or memories of differences that makes a difference. Nevertheless this does highlight the
hierarchical nature and I have added this to the diagram. We have a new level, a level for
information. Information is of a
higher logical type than data so I have drawn it hierarchically above data.
Information is
a record or description or memory of difference about differences about; where, what, when, whom, and
how many. In other words what we “know
of.” The distinction between data and
information is functional, not structural, structurally they are the same
(Ackoff 1991/1999 pg 170). So
functionally we have a hierarchy as drawn, but structurally we do not have a
hierarchy at all and the two collapse together. As already expressed, not all data is
information, information is “the answer to the question asked” (Goldratt
1990, pg 85), in other words information depends upon what we already know
and wish to confirm or what we don’t know and wish to seek out, knowledge in
other words. So what then is
knowledge? Elliott Jaques (2006, page pair 20) provides a definition of knowledge as follows; The aspect of mental processing that goes on in words constitutes our knowledge: All knowledge is verbally articulated, and is held in memory. You may sense something, but if you cannot state it, you do not know it. Knowledge is the mental processing that goes on in words – hold onto that thought. Hold onto it because this caused me a great deal of concern and I need to address that issue here and now so that we can re-address it more fully later. This definition of knowledge concerned me because it specifically excludes what I understand as tacit “knowing” from being knowledge. If you sense something but cannot state it, you do not know it! I now understand this viewpoint better as a truly Western epistemological definition – that is, knowledge must be explicit – but it is still one that is difficult to accept from someone who was so in-tune with the shop floor. In fact Jaques fully understood that the underlying tacit component is not verbal but rather is; sensing, or unconscious, or intuitive. He calls it “skill” and combines both explicit knowledge and tacit skill as “skilled knowledge” or K/S in his shorthand and observes it teleologically as “applied capability” (2006, page pair 18). Specifically; AC = ¦ CMP • V/C • K/S That is; applied capability is a function of the
complexity of mental processing as affected by values and commitment and
knowledge and skills. In other words,
what you are capable of is determined by your innate ability, how much you
value and are committed to the task at hand, and your accumulated knowledge
and skill that is applicable in this instance. We tend to get better at what we like, and
maybe like more what we are better at – within the limits of our innate
ability. Complexity of mental processing, the thing that I
have perhaps mislabeled as “innate ability” is, in a Jaquesian sense, much
more than just an IQ view of intelligence, and much more than we can address
here. But introducing intelligence
into the mix does allow me to flag an important observation about the
intelligence trap raised by Edward De Bono (1982). If you have ever had to deal with
intelligent people you might want to check this out. If we start to look around for more definitions of knowledge, especially amongst the epistemologists, we soon find full admission for the tacit component. Ackoff and Emery (1972, pg 46) in discussing the individuality of psychological systems look at the response capabilities in terms of knowledge, understanding, and intelligence. They assert that knowledge is used in at least 2 senses; (1) Awareness or possession of a fact
or state of affairs. (2) Possession of a practical skill. The first sense is used in the context of “an
individual’s true beliefs or what he is aware of” and the second sense is
used in the context of knowing-how to do something rather than knowing-about
or knowing-of something. The two other
terms; understanding and intelligence we shall return to in a later section,
because there is in fact huge commonality between Ackoff/Emery, and Jaques. Both recognize that knowledge is
explicit. Both also recognize that
skill is tacit. Both recognize the
aggregation of the two is something called applied capability or response
capability. Let’s update our hierarchy to reflect this new
level. Knowledge is about know-how,
not know-of or know-about, it is of a higher logical type than information,
it is information about information.
Let’s draw this.
A last word.
For Deming knowledge came from theory (1994, pg 106) and I will
introduce theory into the argument in a few sections hence. But note also, that Deming’s acknowledged
source about systems, and I suspect ultimately epistemology and his Theory of
Profound Knowledge, came from Introduction To Operations Research (1957) by
C. West Churchman, Russell L. Ackoff, and E. Leonard Arnoff. Ackoff and Deming also collaborated in a
number of presentations. Understanding
Ackoff helps to understand Deming. Both Jaques, and Ackoff and Emery, are very close in their definitions
of knowledge to that of Michael Polanyi’s division of explicit and tacit
knowing – practical and intellectual (1966, pp 6-7). Polanyi in fact replaced explicit
“knowledge” with “belief and commitment” (1958, pp 299-324). Semantics maybe,
but here are Ackoff and Emery saying the same thing (1972, pg 46); “what an
individual truly believes or whatever he is aware of, he knows.” Therefore, I’ve removed knowledge and replaced it with belief and
commitment – because this is what it really is.
Polanyi says what we know is a belief, Ackoff says what we believe we
know, and I think that we should leave it at that. Let’s
now examine the piece that many people care not to care for –
understanding. Understanding and
knowledge (sorry I have to use that word again but you now know where to map
it) are to each other as information and data are to each other. That is they are structurally the same but
functionally different. Functionally,
understanding is of a higher logical type than is knowledge. Whereas knowledge deals with know-how,
understanding deals with know-why.
Understanding is beliefs about beliefs and commitment. Let’s draw this in.
If
we were to view this hierarchy structurally we could collapse it in to two
layers, data and information in one layer and knowledge and understanding in
another higher layer. Functionally,
however, we must expand it out into the 4 layers that we have here. Each layer is of a different and higher
logical type than that of the lower layer. Is
the distinction between knowledge and understanding real? Clearly it is. Is it worthwhile to pursue then? I think so.
Consider one of the classic examples of diffusion of innovation –
scurvy. The first controlled
experiment using lemon juice was carried out in 1601, but it took until 1795
for citrus to be adopted as protection against scurvy by the British Royal
Navy, and until 1865 by the merchant marine (Rogers 2003, pp 7-8). Now, if you look at this example, there are
two aspects, the know-how and the know-why.
The know-how was available as early as 1601, the know-why – that
vitamin C deficiency is the causal agent of scurvy – wasn’t known until very
much later; in fact 1932, and there were very many confounding issues along
the way. It is infinitely more difficult
to accept know-how in the absence of the requisite know-why. The other common example that springs to
mind is hand-washing in medicine. The
know-how long preceded the know-why and the know-why, as with vitamin C, was
paradigmal in nature because the causal agents were of a different scale and
unknown to us at first. To
data, information, knowledge, and understanding we can add one more aspect,
wisdom. And to do so we must entertain
some slightly different aspects. Let’s
have a look at this. Wisdom,
like knowledge, initially caused me some concern, and again that concern was
derived from the definitions of Elliott Jaques. Jaques and Clement (1991, pp 76-79)
recognise wisdom as an essential aspect of capability for effective
managerial leadership; which everyone knows about but which is difficult to capture
in words. wisdom has to do with the soundness of a person’s judgement
about the ways of the world, about what people are like and how they are
likely to react. This
follows on immediately from their discussion of knowledge and skills and
values. And it is values that Ackoff
asserts that makes wisdom different from other aspects of our knowledge
hierarchy (1999, pg 171). Wisdom deals with values. It involves the exercise of judgment. ...
A judgment of the value of an act is never independent of the judge
and seldom is the same for two judges. So both Jaques and Clement and Ackoff agree that wisdom is a judgment
issue, Ackoff asserts that the judgment is relative to values. Moreover, values are an ethical and aesthetic pursuit (Ackoff 1998, pg
26); The production of data, information, knowledge, and understanding are primarily functions of science. The production of wisdom, which presupposes all four, is primarily a function of ethics and aesthetics because it involves the conscious insertion of values into human decision making and evaluation of its outcomes. So, what to do? Ackoff has
split wisdom off from; data, information, knowledge and understanding, and
few others – Jaques and Clement excepted – seem even remotely interested in
addressing such issues. Fortunately
Ackoff provides a clue in the above by the division between science, and
ethics/aesthetics. He uses the ancient
Greek philosophic division of the pursuits of man (Ackoff 1978/1999, pg
139. See also Ackoff 1998 above). The divisions are; §
The scientific – the pursuit of truth §
The political-economic – the pursuit of power
and plenty §
The ethical-moral – the pursuit of goodness
and virtue §
The aesthetic – the pursuit of beauty I introduce these now to show the “side-branching” that values
introduce into our argument, and also as a precursor to a better
understanding of leadership which we will return to in due course. Ackoff considers these classes not to be
exclusive – clearly we can understand that something that is scientific might
also so be political-economic, and as we will see also aesthetic – but he
does consider them to be exhaustive. This is how our diagram must now look.
If knowledge and understanding are the know-how and know-why of
science, then wisdom must be the know-worth of science, ethics, and
aesthetics. We will return to this
soon enough. Knowing that we mentioned intelligence and then left it alone at the
time, we shouldn’t mention values and leave them in the same situation. We need to know right now, what are
values? And to answer that question I
turn to Jaques (2006, page pair 16); What you value is what you
want, what you would give priority to – things that attract you, that you
will work for or fight for, that give direction, that determine how much you
will put into something. Values, especially personal values, are so important and so
understated in modern enterprise and yet they are hierarchically superior. Robert Dilts (1998, pp 36-37) uses a hierarchy known as neurological
levels, or more simply as a network of logical levels, and which I have
previously used in the powerpoint called Values Beliefs and
Industrialization. It is values and
beliefs that drive the capability of an organization and for a modern serial
dependent (industrial) organization this also determines its effectiveness. Now let’s go back a step. There is a commonality between the work of Jaques and that of Ackoff
and Emery that I want to return to. Jaques said Applied Capability is a function of; Complexity
of Mental Processing , Values & Commitment, Knowledge & Skills Ackoff and Emery said that Response
Capabilities
are a function of; Intelligence,
Knowledge, and Understanding Really the only difference is the apparent omission of values and commitment in the Ackoff and Emery description – and having said that, they argue for an “intention” (relative value) function at the same level as knowledge so in fact all the same elements are present (1972, pg 58). The key mapping however is Ackoff and Emery’s use of “intelligence” and Jaques use of “mental processing capability.” Ackoff and Emery define intelligence as having to do with the rate at which a subject can learn, and learning in-turn is an increase in degree of knowledge or understanding over time (1972, pg 52). Jaques (2006, page pair 18) argues that mental processing is; The mental processes by which you take information, pick it over, play with it, analyze it, put it together, reorganize it, judge and reason with it, make conclusions, plans and decisions and take action. Complexity of mental processing is; The maximum scale and complexity of the world that you are able to pattern and construe and function in, including the amount and complexity of information that must be processed in doing so. So, I will assert that in essence, Jaques and, Ackoff and Emery, are pretty much on the same target and we should take some satisfaction from that. I have tried to stress that data to wisdom is hierarchical; that is
each layer is of a higher logical type than the layer below, and in order for
that to be the case there must be more members in the lower layers than in
the higher layers. We should draw it
as a pyramid, I’ve been economical (lazy) and drawn it as a “ladder,” rung
upon rung. I will impose a pyramid
upon this latter on. Data to wisdom is recursive. It
doesn’t start at one point and progress step-wise up or down the “ladder,”
rather we jump from place to place – around and around – and build out to our
final picture. How we view this
depends upon the concept of generality.
The concept of generality is Ackoff again, and we will come to this in
a moment or two. Data to wisdom requires experience, and experience requires time. It goes without saying and so I must say
it; recursion takes time. Time allows
one to experience the same or similar sets of occurrences – maybe over and
over – and to build a better understanding as a result. The if ... then of causality contains time, but the if ... then of logic is timeless. It follows that logic is an incomplete model of causality (Bateson, 1979, pg 55). Cyberneticists (and mechanical engineers before them) were
deeply concern with the role of feedback – I wanted to say obsessed – and
more the temporal component of such.
In the often cited example of a steam engine governor, one that feeds
back too fast, and equally one that feeds back too slow will cause the
machine to fail in one direction or the other. Bateson is simply saying here that logic
takes no account of these timing issues whatsoever and is therefore an
incomplete model. There is more on the
incompleteness of cause and effect later. Goldratt was a physicist and thus used what I will
call “mechanistic” cause and effect, and which he would have more correctly called
effect-cause-effect (Goldratt 1990, pp 22-35). And this approach has spawn some amazing
graphical “trees” which show the relationships between these elements. This type of logic makes a distinction
between necessity and sufficiency.
Ackoff defines these two terms as follows; Text But Ackoff also makes the point that we as
scientists have for a long time been “lying” to ourselves because; Text Now I have never seen producer/product logic and
assume that it is no different from cause and effect, except that it
acknowledges insufficiency. But I want
people to recognize that indeed the problem of distinction between what is
necessary and what is sufficient, and having got there how much sufficiency
is sufficient is well recognized.
Anyone who has ever done a process map or a project plan will know
exactly this problem – what degree of “granularity” to leave in and what to
leave out. Ackoff is also fond of the terms “means” and
“ends.” Which I take to be cause and
effect, perhaps with a little bit of the particulars and the general mixed
in. Means and ends is often a useful
set of terms in a business setting rather than cause and effect. People understand it much more intuitively. But all of this is still largely mechanistic; fine
for “closed” physical systems, but not for “open” biological or social
systems. The cyberneticists took
exception to this and proposed stimulus and response; In general in communicational systems, we deal with sequences which resemble stimulus-and-response rather than cause-and-effect. When one billiard ball strikes another, there is an energy transfer such that the motion of the second ball is energized by the impact of the first. In communicational systems, on the other hand, the energy of response is usually provided by the respondent. If I kick a dog, his immediately sequential behavior is energized by his metabolism, not by my kick. Similarly, when one neuron fires another, or an impulse from a microphone activates a circuit, the sequent event has its own energy sources (Bateson 1972, pg 409). Of course the response of the dog may no longer be mechanistic but we
have certainly strived for a long time to retain it as deterministic. Ackoff also deals to that by advancing the
notion of “purposefulness” (Ackoff & Emery 1972), but we should leave
that for another day. Deming (1994, pg 102) defined knowledge in terms of theory but we
haven’t addressed theory within our hierarchy yet. We need to do this, here is what Deming had
to say; Knowledge is built on
theory. The theory of knowledge
teaches us that a statement, if it conveys knowledge, predicts future
outcome, with the risk of being wrong, and that it fits without failure
observations of the past. Rational prediction requires theory and builds knowledge through systematic revision and extension of theory based on comparison of prediction with observation. Let’s add a rider to this from Jaques and Clement (1991, pg 77); Unsound theories distort our
experience, narrow our vision, and leave us none the wiser about the effects
of our actions on others. Action
without sound theory is folly. So where does theory fit into our epistemological hierarchy? Ackoff (1962/1999, pg 302) supplies part of
the answer in terms of levels of generality. One statement can be said to be more general than another if it implies and is not implied by the other; that is, if the truth of the second necessarily follows from the truth of the first and not conversely. Scientific statements are about things under certain conditions. The larger the class of things to which reference is made, and the more inclusive the set of conditions, the more general is the statement. ... The less general a statement, the more fact-like it is; the more general a statement, the more law-like it is. Hence, facts and laws represent ranges along the scale of generality. There is no well-defined point of separation between these ranges. ... A theory is a still further generalization. Fact, law, and theory are hierarchical, if not also
of different logical types. Let’s draw
these.
Now I want to stitch the simple hierarchy of; fact, law, and theory
into our previous hierarchy of data, information, knowledge, understanding,
and wisdom. This is how it looks.
Theory has a
particular property as explained by Polanyi; A theory, moreover, cannot be
led astray by my personal illusions.
To find my way by a map I must perform the conscious act of map‑reading
and I may be deluded in the process, but the map cannot be deluded and
remains right or wrong in itself, impersonally. Consequently, a theory on which I rely as
part of my knowledge remains unaffected by any fluctuations occurring within
myself. It has a rigid formal
structure, on whose steadfastness I can depend whatever mood or desire may
possess me (1958, pg 4). A
theory, being more general than a fact, is always at “risk” of new facts – or
so it would seem. Deming states (1999,
pg 104) and many people accept at face value that, “No number of examples
establishes a theory, yet a single unexplained failure of a theory requires
modification or even abandonment of the theory.” Now I could well accept that for something
like “this process under investigation
does not work as expected because ....., and a hypothesis is put
forward. Subsequent data might indeed
invalidate that “local” hypothesis, that after all would seem to be the
genesis of plan, do, check, act (PDCA).
But it doesn’t work at higher levels of generality. Moreover
its takes a Harvard palaeontologist, the late Stephen Jay Gould (1993 pg 440)
to track this more public misconception to one Francis Galton (Darwin’s
cousin) in his autobiography and quoting T. H. Huxley in conversation with
Herbert Spencer; … a
beautiful theory, killed by a nasty, ugly little fact. It was in fact uttered in acerbic sarcasm. In actuality, in the
early stages of new data/theory, science may be quite unsure which to
believe; Often scientists cannot get the numbers that compare well with theory until they know what numbers they should be making nature yield (Kuhn 1977, pg 193). Moreover; In principle, a law or theory can be disconfirmed by just one contradictory fact. But in practice the fact which appears to contradict the law or theory is itself always subject to doubt. Consequently, there have been many historical instances where facts which appear to contradict laws or theories have been rejected in order to maintain a law or theory in which the scientist had more confidence than he did in the fact (Ackoff 1962/1999, pg 305). Kuhn goes one step further; If any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times (1962/1996, pg 146). What produces such confidence?
The answer is the general utility of the current theory in its current
form. The real problems begin when we
no longer doubt the contradiction, and instead might chose to explain away
the anomaly or ignore facts and keep the theory. To explain this we need to add one more
level of generality. And it actually
mirrors the other side better than I could hope. The entity that is currently missing is
paradigm. Paradigm isn’t
an über theory, paradigm is hierarchically superior to theory, a single
paradigm can account for multiple theories.
For instance consider the paradigm of continental drift or plate tectonics, which
replaced the former assumption of a static earth’s surface. This paradigm must allow for the all of the
observations of the volcanologists, and of the sedimentologists and also
those who study the rocks that are squeezed in-between – the metamorphic
geologists. And it ought not just
apply uniquely to our planetary sphere but find utility in other planetary
spheres as well. It not only explains
our old observations better, it causes us to seek out whole new classes of
observations that we didn’t even know that we were interested in. Let’s draw paradigm in its appropriate place.
My own work has been little
concerned with the specification of scientific values, but it has from the
start presupposed their existence and role.
That role does not require that values be identical in all scientific
communities or, in any given community, at all periods of time. Nor does it demand that a value system be
so precisely specified and so free from internal conflict that it could, even
in abstract principle, unequivocally determine the choices that individual
scientists must make. Scientific paradigm is value-full and the value is derived from the
deep sociology that binds various groups of scientists together. Traditional discussions of scientific method have sought a set of rules that would permit any individual who followed them to produce sound knowledge. I have tried to insist, instead that, though science is practiced by individuals, scientific knowledge is intrinsically a group product and that neither its peculiar efficacy nor the manner in which it develops will be understood without reference to the special nature of the groups that produce it. In this sense my work has been deeply sociological, but not in a way that permits that subject to be separated from epistemology (Kuhn 1977, pg xx). Note carefully that both Ackoff and Kuhn distinguish between
scientific philosophy (epistemology) and scientific methodology. It is the methodology that is carried out
by individuals, but the underlying philosophy (explicit or otherwise) is a
group undertaking. Polanyi (1958)
extensively develops the tacit component of this argument. If you think that paradigm doesn’t have a social context, then think
only of Copernicus seeking out God’s perfection in the solar system within
the pre-supposition of perfect circular orbits – which he never abandoned. Or consider the incontrovertible evidence
that European glacial moraine presented for the aftermath of the biblical
flood. Epistemology and ontology are
inextricably mixed-up. Science is
cultural, but at least it moves away from falsehoods by eventually
challenging them and removing them. Scientists – that is, creative
scientists – spend their lives in trying to guess right. They are sustained and guided therein by
their heuristic passion. We call their
work creative because it changes the world as we see it, by deepening our
understanding of it. The change is
irrevocable. A problem that I have
once solved can no longer puzzle me; I cannot guess what I already know. Having made a discovery, I shall never see
the world again as before. My eyes
have become different; I have made myself into a person seeing and thinking
differently. I have crossed a gap, the
heuristic gap which lies between problem and discovery (Polanyi 1958, pg
143). Does paradigm only exist in science?
I think not. Even though Kuhn
coined the term to explain the way in which science progresses and contrasted
this with the pre-paradigmal schools in some of the more recent “social”
sciences, these are the same pre-paradigmal schools of thought that
previously existed in early science. Think of ethics for instance.
Once, not very long ago, ownership of slaves – regardless of race –
was an accepted practice. Even today,
there are countries where entrenched social orders essentially impose a full
servitude, or subjugation, even if actual ownership is no longer a
question. We have come a long way, and
not very far at the same time. It is
paradigmal in nature. Think of aesthetics, the arrival of the camera (the ones that took
film) released artists from the task of faithfully recording places and
people and sparked-off impressionism – the abstract recording of places and
people – and of emotions. And in doing
so we “lost” the knowledge of the role and skill of using equipment such as
the camera obscura which had been an essential component prior to impressionism. The arrival of impressionism was
paradigmal, the skills of realism where lost in the process. What about politics and economy?
Well if you read The Economist you will soon learn that they don’t
give up on “banging-on” about Japan and how the sooner companies there
“reform” themselves along Western lines the better. They do this about once a quarter, which
over the years becomes rather tiresome.
Sometimes, for variety, they also pick on the Germans, the Italians,
or the French. What do we have here? A paradigm, a paradigm called the
Anglo-American model. This is the
model that you follow if you want to destroy your own industry in your own
country (then pretend that it was more efficient to “off-shore” it). So what then is the difference between paradigm in science, and
paradigm in ethics, aesthetics, or politics and economy? The answer to that is that science has an
external reference – the natural world.
That still doesn’t make it easy to “prove” anything, but it does make
it immeasurably easier to probe against this reference (even though we do
this within our cultural and value-laden ways). In all of the social aspects, however, we
become an indivisible part of the whole in which we are trying to carry out
the validation on. In all paradigm we
are caught in what Bateson terms double description. Bateson tackles the notion of the
intractability of double description; Every abduction may be seen as
a double or multiple description of some object or event or sequence. If I
examine the social organization of an Australian tribe and the sketch of
natural relations upon which totemism is based, I can see these two bodies of
knowledge as related abductively, as both falling under the same rules. In each
case, it is assumed that certain formal characteristics of one component will
be mirrored in the other. This repetition has certain very effective implications. It carries injunctions, for the people concerned. Their ideas about nature, however, fantastic, are supported by their social system; conversely, the social system is supported by their ideas of nature. It thus becomes very difficult for the people, so doubly guided, to change their view either of nature or of the social system. For the benefits of stability, they pay the price of rigidity, living, as all human beings must, in an enormously complex network of mutually supporting presuppositions. The converse of this statement is that change will require various sorts of relaxation or contradiction within the system of presuppositions (1979, pg 134). Even the Copernican Revolution was a double
description. Copernicus was a rector of the Catholic Church in Poland, he was
seeking God’s perfection in the universe by attempting to provide a better
explanation for the planetary orbits as viewed from the earth. His logic was harmonizing or simplifying,
and enduring, but his accuracy or practicality at the time was no better than
the system that he sought to replace. As an extension of the concept of double description, Bateson also
used the concept of a double bind, developed from his observations of schizophrenic patients and anything
schizophrenic ought to be eminently suited to business – right? Since hospitals exist for the
benefit of personnel as well as ‑ as much as ‑ more than ‑ for the patient's
benefits, there will be contradictions at times in sequences where actions
are taken "benevolently" for the patient when actually they are
intended to keep the staff more comfortable.
We would assume that whenever the system is organized for hospital
purposes and it is announced to the patient that the actions are for his
benefits, then the schizophrenic situation is being perpetuated. This kind of deception will provoke the
patient to respond to it as a double bind situation, and his response will be
"schizophrenic" in the sense that it will be indirect and the
patient will be unable to comment on the fact that he feels he is being
deceived (1972, pg 225). Double binds are incredibly important concepts in a business
setting. The paradox of systemism, at
its heart, is a double bind. We fear
for our sense of identity but we believe that we are unable to say so. Double binds are not simple
dilemmas, but rather where simple dilemmas are compounded by falsified
contexts, supported by patterns of interpersonal communication which ensured
continuation of the denial that a falsified context existed (Harries-Jones,
1995 pg 135). Jerry Harvey’s development of the concept of group
think around negative fantasy (1988) – the so-called Abilene Paradox – is a
brilliant example of the more general case of a falsified context that is
“undiscussable,” indeed is intended to be exactly that. We have already noted that Bateson finds that man is bound within a
net of epistemological and ontological premises which become partially
self-validating, or in other words circular. Polanyi was more direct on this point; Any enquiry into our ultimate beliefs can be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions. It must be intentionally circular (Polanyi, 1958 pg 299). We tend to recoil against assertions of circularity
whereas epistemology considers it part of the territory. In a quote that I always have the greatest
difficulty tracking down Harries-Jones in his exploration of Bateson’s
thinking has this to say about circularity; Bateson took the position that inductive science may abhor tautology, but nature does not. Logicians may regard any method which does not permit the insertion of independent criteria between the first and subsequent statements as suspect or falsifying, but this does not hold in nature. Tautology occurs in nature because nature does not 'think' in either inductive or deductive terms. In natural contexts, the formal 'cause' of that which is necessary may be defined by that which is necessary (Harries-Jones, 1995 pp 178-179). We know this more commonly by examples such as; survival of the
fittest, where the fittest are clearly those that survive. We are troubled by the circularity, whereas
nature and epistemologists are not. I wonder how many times I have been taken aside and told that my
“language” is causing an issue, and asked why I don’t use plain English as
that would be easier for everyone. Yes
sure, it would be easier, but then no one would understand. Moreover, more commonly than not the
requester is using, at the very least a technical jargon, or at the worst
some obfuscation management-speak, without even being aware of it – such is
life. Language is important to all
participants. One thing that binds the
members of any scientific community together and simultaneously
differentiates them from the members of other apparently similar groups is
their possession of a common language or special dialect. ...
In learning such a language, as they must to participate in their
community’s work, new member acquire a set of cognitive commitments that are
not, in principle, fully analyzable within that language itself. Such commitments are a consequence of the
ways in which the terms, phrases, and sentences of the language are applied
to nature ... (Kuhn 1977, pg xxii). Polanyi said much the same as the extract from Kuhn above; For just as, owing to
the ultimately tacit nature of all our knowledge, we remain ever unable to
say all that we know, so also, in view of the tacit character of meaning, we
can never quite know what is implied in what we say (Polanyi, 1958, pg
95). Polanyi explains the interaction of language and paradigm more fully
and much better than I could hope to reproduce – I stopped at this extract for many months. Do the justice of reading it. The key to everything that we do is in those
few pages. This may be the point at which my
lack of exposure to Karl Popper finally catches up with me. I want to start with the concept of simplicity
in science and then say a little about elegance or indeed harmony. As a scientist it something of an
implicit assumption – to this one at least – that there is inherent
simplicity in science. And I guess
that in part is a result of tacit absorption or socialization. Let’s use something as basic as the
periodic table – basic that is to us today, we take its organizing capability
for granted. There is an inherent
simplicity about the periodic table and such confidence in its underlying
principles that in the early days at least, the “holes” in the table were the
targets of fruitful research. But that
is a kind of an after-the-fact, post-discovery justification, a narrative
fallacy if you will. But why do we
seek such apparent simplicity? The text book Popperian answer is
that as we simplify an idea, its applicability must become more and more
general – that’s what Ackoff was saying in his law of generality – and that
has been the main tenor of our discussion of the DIKUW hierarchy. The Popperian argument is that as an idea
becomes simpler and more general and applicable to more and more instances,
the chances of proving that it is wrong or that it is incomplete, or that it
is in need of revision increases. Failure
to uncover such instances as the breadth of the haul increases also increases
our confidence that indeed the idea is valid. Increasing confidence that an idea is
valid is, of course, not proof that it is correct. To make that claim would be an inductive
fallacy. We can only continue to find
that it is not incorrect; we can only continue to fail to disprove it. Harmony rather than elegance is the
term that Copernicus used to argue for a heliocentric universe; “Harmony”
seems a strange basis on which to argue for the earth’s motion, particularly
since the harmony is so obscured by the complex multitude of circles that
make up the full Copernican system.
Copernicus’ arguments are not pragmatic. They appeal, if at all, not to the
utilitarian sense of the practicing astronomer but to his aesthetic sense and
to that alone … they could and did appeal primarily to that limited and
perhaps irrational subgroup of mathematical astronomers whose Neoplatonic ear
for mathematical harmonies could not be obstructed by page after page of
complex mathematics leading finally to numerical predictions scarcely better
than those they had known before (Kuhn 1957/2003 pg 181). Harmony or elegance is an expression of simplifying widespread
applicability. It is the explanation
of a large array of occurrences, without recourse to special pleading to
explain specific effects. Kuhn
explains that anomaly always requires the invocation of special cause (Ref). Skip This
One Section Here Anomaly is explained (away) by specific cause (not to be
confused with the special cause of statistics). Specific cause, or rather a number of
specific causes becomes somewhat in-elegant.
It begins to look like special pleading. Specific
causes may be expeditious for some, but they become in-elegant for others. What is tolerable anomaly for one because
of the overall benefits that accrue from that tolerance is intolerable for
another, and that is the point of departure for new theory or new
modification of existing theory, or indeed paradigm. This is how
knowledge progress when we are bound within a circularity of partially
self-validating. Premises that find
greater and greater utility through simpler and simpler verbalizations. The answer is that knowledge progresses
through the presence of anomaly. Seed and
remnant Doubts
about a prevailing world view usually begin with the appearances of dilemmas. A dilemma
is a problem or a question that cannot be solved or answered within the
prevailing world view and therefore calls it into question (Ackoff, pg 14
referencing Kuhn) Polanyi describes how even anomaly can be
accommodated, in fact, must be accommodated within this circularity (in
context of epicyclic reserves and Azande example). However,
Kuhn, writing independently and after Polanyi, does offer a way out as we
have already seen. The “seed” of the
new belief is embedded in the old belief and the remnant of the old belief
remains embedded in the new belief.
This is how we can get around the language issue. Polanyi in his book The Tacit Dimension, mentions
“ Meno’s paradox” from Plato where it is said; that to search for the
solution of a problem is an absurdity; for either you know what you are
looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not know what you are
looking for, and then you cannot expect to find anything (1966/2009, pg
22-24). And more from
the same page (24) to re Restart In the preceding work we established the
hierarchical nature of; o Data, information, knowledge,
understanding, and wisdom o Fact, law, theory, and paradigm All within the context of science, ethics, and
aesthetics. This is a coat hanger of
sorts from which I now want to hang a number of continuums, for instance; epistemology
and ontology, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction and so
forth. The material that follows is
the pictorial “ordering” in my mind of these related concepts. I also want to group these into
“traditional,” “cross-over,” and “recent” examples. Those of the traditional are more to do
with science and philosophy and recent are those to do with business,
cross-over is caught somewhere in the middle ground. These distinctions are not so important;
they are more along the lines of a temporal ordering. What I hope is that in the end this
ordering will help you, and it has helped me, to get a hand on a significant
array of interrelated concepts. Maybe it is
better to refer to these as continuums rather than hierarchies. We already know from Ackoff’s concept of
generality that what something “is” depends upon where you are in relation to
it, and this will become clearer as we progress through the first several of
these examples. Ackoff (1981/1999, pg
17) suggests for example that synthesis and analysis that they are
complementary entities; Like the head and tail of a coin, they can be considered separately, but they cannot be separated. Other pairs
immediately spring to mind, such as; strategy and tactics, or leadership and
followership. It is these pairs that
appeal to me and although we might place leadership “above” followership, or
strategy “above” tactics, Ackoff’s distinction above is probable more
correct. What will become apparent is
that one is more dominant at one end of the continuum – almost of the total
exclusion of the other – and vice versa.
In-between we have complementary admixtures of the two. I want to go
and hang some of these pairs (coats) on the coat hanger that we have
constructed. Let’s do that. The first
thing that I want to “hang” on this coat hanger is the concept of
epistemology and ontology, because they are central to almost everything that
we will discuss. We already know that
they are intertwined and inseparable, but each is stronger at particular ends
of the continuum.
I now want to
separate out some traditional ontological aspects and then some traditional
epistemological aspects. This
separation maybe a little arbitrary, but I will repeat it again for so-called
“cross-over” ontology and epistemology, and fail to make the distinction at
all as we move into pairs that are more related to modern business. Let’s start
with the pair of the general and the particular. In fact that is what we have been doing all
the while – moving from the particular; data, information, and facts, towards
the general; understanding, wisdom, and paradigm.
Very often, as
we move from the bottom towards the top matters become more and more
abstract, and as we move from the top towards the bottom matters become more
and more concrete.
§ Pre-Verbal § Concrete Verbal § Symbolic Verbal § Conceptual Verbal § Universals He argues for a recurring stepwise development of logical thought at
each level (Jaques and Cason 1994).
That is about as much justice as I can do to that concept here and
now. I strongly recommend
investigating their approach. Having established where our concrete and our abstract map
ontologically, we can proceed (circularly without doubt) to
epistemology. There are two
epistemological traditions in Western philosophy (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995 pp
21-22). They are; ·
Empiricism which argues inductively from
sensory experiences ·
Rationalism which argues deductively from
abstract constructs Let me expand these out or else they will cause immediate confusion
with the diagram above’ ·
Empiricism which argues inductively from
sensory experiences to abstract constructs ·
Rationalism which argues deductively from
abstract constructs to sensory experience These are now drawn below;
|
